In a recent paper (2006), Pestieu et.al. showed that the optimal payroll tax rate for the PAYG pension in an open large economy should increase as number of countries increases. This rather counterintuitive result -increasing the factor mobility makes redistribution easier-depends on a crucial assumption of the only one tax ; payroll tax. In this paper, analysis of the optimal PAYG pension in the small open economy setting is attempted. Under this new situation, it is shown here that the standard result of trade-off between equity and increase in the capital mobility could be restored. In deriving such result the assumption of variable labor supply plays an important part.
1 2 system in autarky is analyzed as in Pestieu et. al. In chapter 4, it is expanded to the case of the small open economy, which is followed by the conclusion in the final chapter.
The basic model : Closed Economy
The model here is a standard OLG model where people live for two periods.
There are I kinds of people differing by their productivity as in Pestieu et.al. where w i is the wage rate of type i individual's, r is the rate of return on capital and s i t is saving.
Production function
, where capital is denoted by K and labor L, is a standard neoclassical one. Thus, it is quasi-concave and homogeneous of degree 1 in factors. Denoting y = Y/L and k = K/L, the following should hold as long as factor markets are perfectly competitive.
Aggregate labor supply is given by
where N t is the size of the generation t with constant rate of growth n. Until 3 the last chapter, we will assume that the labor supply is fixed. The average value of the productivity term is assumed to be equal to 1, i.e.,
In the closed economy, capital accumulation is given by individuals' savings.
Thus, the following holds:
Given w and r t+1 , individuals maximize an identical utility function with standard properties subject to (1), (2):
From the first order conditions, we can derive the savings and the indirect utility functions:
Now, we will derive the first best optimum. First, the intergenerational capital market constraint is defined by substituting (3), (4) and (7) in (6):
It is assumed that there exists a unique stable steady-state equilibrium denoted by k*:
Social optimality (first best) is obtained by solving the following constrained maximization problem, that is, maximizing the sum of lifetime utilities over types (utilitarian social welfare function) in the steady-state subject to the resource constraint :
where c and d denote average values.
In the steady-state, the following (standard) optimality conditions are obtained.
These are the standard results that one can get from the similar analysis.
Throughout the paper, the standard assumption that the market solution for k is below the golden rule value is used. In other words, there is an underaccumulation of the capital.
Redistributive PAYG pension in autarky with fixed labor supply
In this section, Pestieu et. al.'s reanalysis will be reviewed briefly since it is the starting point of our analysis. As in their model, it is assumed that each individual supplies fixed one unit of labor in the autarky. Then the aggregate 5 labor supply function (5) will be changed to
PAYG pension scheme is the one that current retirees (the old generation)
receive the flat benefit z , while the current workers (young generation) contribute at the same payroll tax rate τ . Therefore, the following holds :
From profit maximization, interest rate and wage can be represented as a function of k as in (3), (4) 
Since labor supply is fixed, an individual's indirect utility function can be represented in the reduced form of three arguments ; after tax income, interest factor , and flat rate pension. Thus,
I*n (9), we can have partial derivatives 
. This negative sign results from the stability of the steady state.
(see Pestieu et. al.) Therefore, the indirect utility function (9) is a function of τ and the optimization problem of the government becomes :
Differentiating this with respect to τ , first order condition for the steady-state optimum is derived. (10) is the resulting expression which should be equated to 0. As in Pestieu et. al., the expectation operator is used for simplicity in deriving this.
Here, it is necessary to introduce the following term :
This term is positive. Substituting this term into the above expression, we get:
Thus, for the optimal steady-state tax to be obtained, the following condition should be met.
It shows that the optimal tax rate is positively related to an equity term (the first
which is positive, and negatively to r-n, which is the measure of underaccumulation with respect to the golden rule. Besides, it is negatively related to the last term, which is the covariance between the marginal utility of income and the rate of saving, because it is negative. The sign of this term plays a crucial role in the subsequent analysis.
These are the basic results in Pestieu et. al., along with their major conclusion that the payroll tax rate will increase as the number of countries in the world increases. Also, they show that this Nash equilibrium will end up with the worldwide under accumulation of capital. As a matter of fact, if it is the case, it is natural for governments to try the tax harmonization or tax treaty.
In this paper, we try to analyze whether this conclusion can hold under the small open economy setting. For this, we will start with the case of fixed labor supply followed by the variable labor supply case. Proposition 2) If , it is possible that the optimal payroll tax rate in the autarky is higher than that in the small open economy since .
Proof) The following diagram is sufficient to prove this result.
<Fig. 1> Relationship between r and τ when the labor supply is fixed
Intuition behind these results are as follows: If the interest rate is given, k, subsequently w, are all given since the labor supply is fixed. In this case, raising the tax rate will increase the (utilitarian) welfare of the society because
doing so will not decrease the production. Particularly, in the case that the interest rate is low, optimal tax rate should be equal to 1 because the equal consumption across individuals in the same generation will maximize the utilitarian social welfare function ( (13) is positive when r is equal to n) 4 . On the other hand, if the exogenously given interest rate is high, the optimal tax rate should become lower because the current period consumption becomes more valuable 5 . It should be reminded that the payroll tax works not only as an intragenerational but also an intergenerational redistributive mechanism.
In the next section, we would like to see whether this conclusion can hold under the variable labor supply setting. With the variable labor supply assumption, somewhat different conclusions are drawn.
2. Small open economy with variable labor supply
First it is assumed that an individual's utility function is additively separable in consumption and leisure. As in the previous subsection, we will compare the optimal tax rates in autarky and the open economy.
In autarky with variable labor supply, an individual's indirect utility function will be changed to the following :
4 Capital market is assumed to be perfect 5 In the extreme case that the interest rate is equal to 1, the optimal tax rate should be equal to 0.
11
Which will be further changed to
Subsequently, (11) will be changed to
As is well-known, it is not so clear whether the labor supply is elastic enough to respond to the payroll tax rate (in general, income tax rate) change. Results of empirical studies differ. If it is completely inelastic, then the analysis will be same as the one in the previous section. As can be seen in the following proposition, the effect of the opening on the optimal tax rate depends much on the labor supply change due to the tax rate change; whether the tax rate increase reduces the labor supply or not.
Proposition 3) If labor supply is variable, it is possible to have a case that the optimal payroll tax rate in the small open economy is lower than that of the autarky, when the interest rates in both cases are the same.
Proof) In the case of the fixed labor supply, it is sufficient to check the sign of the term in (12) containing ε (the third term), which will be vanished. Since it is negative, τ 0 is greater than τ A . Here, however, it is not enough to check the sign of the second term in (14), which will be vanished, because of the presence of the third term containing. Even if the second term is vanished, the sign of the remaining terms are not clear. 
Since the second term in the above inequality is equal to zero. Thus, With these two lemmas, we can show that the second term in (14) (14) is relatively small, the sign of the remaining term is positive so that the same logic in the proof of the proposition is applicable to show that τ 0 is greater than τ A, .
It is possible, however, that the reverse is true. In that case, τ 0 is less than τ A, .
This proposition shows that the optimal tax rate can decrease immediately after the opening of the economy contrary to the case of the proposition 1).
Although this does not always hold, it is certainly interesting because the "equity-efficiency trade off" can be restored even if the exogenously given interest rate is the same as the (optimal) interest rate under autarky.
Finally, we can derive the following proposition when the interest rate varies as in the case of the fixed labor supply. Therefore, this proposition is the counterpart of the proposition 2).
Proposition 4) If labor supply is variable, it is possible to have a case that the optimal payroll tax rate in the small open economy is lower than that of the autarky.
Proof) Similar to the proof of Proposition 2), so that it is omitted. In this diagram, it is shown that the optimal tax rate is less than 1 in the extreme
Conclusion
In this paper, we extend the Pestieu et. have lower second best payroll tax rate than that of the autarky. This possibility will increase if the labor supply can vary. Especially, it is interesting to see that the optimal tax rate can be lowered even in the case that the interest rates in two cases-autarky and the small open economy -are the same.
As in the case of Pestieu et. al.'s, this paper is based on very restrictive assumptions. Therefore, the relaxation of such assumptions will be good topics of the future researches. The first one is the introduction of other taxes in the analysis.
Next, the large open economy when the labor supply can vary would be the interesting case to see considering our conclusion of the increased probability of restoring efficiency-equity trade-off.
Besides, some of our results depend on the assumption of perfect capital market.
Relaxation of this assumption, presumably by assuming saving being always positive, is interesting to see. Finally, it is certainly worth seeing how previous results about the effects of the international cooperation could change under this new setting.
